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Abstract 
While recycling helps to limit the use of primary resources, it also requires considerable technological investments in regional 
circular flow systems. The effectiveness of recycling systems, however, also depends on household behavior. Therefore, cur‑
rent research increasingly focuses on behavioral and psychological theories of altruism, moral behavior, and social prefer‑
ences. From an economic perspective, recycling systems can be understood as public goods with contributions resulting in 
positive externalities. In this context, the literature shows that recycling behavior highly depends on the perception of how 
others behave. In neutrally framed public good experiments, contributions tend to increase when alternative public goods are 
offered and group identity is generated. We aim to contribute to this discussion by observing household behavior concerning 
recycling opportunities in controlled settings. For this purpose, we study a laboratory experiment in which individuals con‑
tribute to recycling systems: At first, only one public recycling system (public good) is offered. After dividing societies into 
two clubs, “high” and “low” according to their environmental attitudes, excludable club systems (club goods) are added as 
alternative recycling options for each club. The results of our pilot experiment show that adding a more exclusive recycling 
club option increases individual contributions to recycling compared with a pure public good framework. However, this 
increase in cooperation is only significant for those clubs where members with higher environmental attitudes are pooled.
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Introduction
In recent years, the intensification of industrial recycling 
activities and the improvement of the associated circular 
economy networks have become an essential area of envi‑
ronmental policy. Recycling does not only help to reduce 
the environmental costs caused by waste, but can also be 
used specifically by industrial policy to reduce certain short‑
ages of raw materials, as in the case of rare elements that 
are used in mobile phones. In addition, recycling can be 
used to reduce the carbon footprint of consumption activi‑
ties, helping to mitigate the required space and emissions 
from landfills all around the world. In this paper, we use the 
broader definition of the term “recycling” compared with 
the narrower one in the European waste legislation. Accord‑
ingly, the term comprises all means of how to feed waste 
from components and materials back into the production 
and consumption cycle, including all necessary collection, 
transportation, and treatment steps. Therefore, recycling, 
in the sense addressed in this paper, includes product and 
component reuse, use after remanufacturing and second 
life applications, material and feedstock recycling, as well 
as energy recovery. The term “discarding” as used in this 
paper characterizes the least efficient, yet legal, orderly way 
to get rid of waste in terms of environmental and resource 
efficiency aspects. A third option not addressed in this paper 
comprises the more or less illegal ways of littering. The term 
(legal) “disposal” incorporates all means of how to bundle 
and transfer public waste streams to legal collection systems 
and pass these on to elaborated recycling structures, to be 
transferred down to low‑level discarding systems.
From an economic point of view, recycling is not cost 
free and does not represent a certain kind of a perpetual 
motion machine which allows to overcome the restrictions 
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of the laws of thermodynamics. However, in many cases, it 
is cheaper and more efficient to recycle the raw materials 
contained in the products consumed, instead of disposing 
them in the waste. Even though raising recycling rates is 
a task of environmental policy, the effectiveness of recy‑
cling systems depends on cooperative household behavior. 
Transferring specific waste streams to elaborated collection 
and recycling structures may increase opportunity costs for 
private households by raising the personal effort of inform‑
ing, reflecting, sorting, and depositing in comparison with 
collective disposal at the most convenient point.
Economic literature highlights positive externalities in the 
case of recycling. Households that voluntarily participate in 
recycling systems also contribute to the internalization of 
external effects associated with conventional waste manage‑
ment. For at least four decades, recycling‑related behavior of 
private households has been investigated in a large number 
of empirical studies (such as Kinnaman 2009; Beede and 
Bloom 1995). These studies, for instance, address the ques‑
tion of which regulatory conditions or which social norms 
and motives have a positive effect on recycling behavior. 
Although several papers on recycling behavior marginally 
consider elements of strategic interaction and mutual influ‑
ence within peer groups, most of them lack explicit game‑
theoretical elements where individuals voluntarily contribute 
to public goods. In this paper, we present an incentivized 
economic experiment where subjects adopt the role of pri‑
vate households and have various options for recycling and 
waste disposal. The underlying model treats recycling as a 
social dilemma situation. Within a society, each recycling 
decision has positive external effects on all other house‑
holds. While it is beneficial for the society as a whole if 
every household is cooperative and involved in recycling as 
fully as possible, each single household has an incentive to 
deviate from that kind of cooperation. Moreover, we give 
households the opportunity not only to participate in large 
public recycling systems, but also to contribute to smaller, 
more exclusive recycling clubs whose members, to a large 
degree, also share specific environmental attitudes. The con‑
tribution of our article is, therefore, the examination of the 
following two research questions: First, we ask whether the 
expansion of recycling options leads to an increase in house‑
hold contributions (at all); second, we investigate whether 
the different composition of the clubs affects the decisions 
of their members.
Our paper is organized as follows: The second section 
presents a short overview of the empirical literature on the 
recycling behavior of private households. In the third sec‑
tion, we discuss the suitability of the club good model for an 
experimental investigation of recycling behavior. The fourth 
section entails a description of the experimental design we 
employ and is followed by a presentation of the results of our 
study in the fifth section. The last section offers a summary 
of the main observations and derives some conclusions with 
respect to the design of further research.
Recycling behavior of private households
State of the theoretical and empirical literature
Environmental economics treats recycling as a classic case 
of market failure. In this respect, there are external effects 
that differ from public goods only in terms of their aggrega‑
tion to the optimal quantity. The generation of waste can 
be interpreted as a by‑product of private consumption and 
production activities inducing costs for the whole society, 
which are not incorporated in market prices. Over the last 
three decades, economists have investigated different insti‑
tutional arrangements of how to organize recycling systems 
on governmental or municipal levels and emphasized the 
external cost argument for legitimizing such a type of market 
intervention. Empirical estimates of external costs of the dis‑
posal of different types of solid waste are used for analyzing 
costs and benefits of certain recycling systems (Kinnaman 
2009; Beede and Bloom 1995). According to environmental 
economics textbooks, recycling problems, when regarded 
as problems of external effects, can be solved by applying 
environmental policy instruments such as deposit systems. 
Suboptimal recycling rates can even be raised to optimal 
levels if the “true” level of external costs is known (Tiet‑
enberg and Lewis 2014). However, taking into account that 
perfect information of environmental regulators is not real‑
istic to assume, and that perfect knowledge about consumer 
behavior is not available, things become more complicated. 
Environmental policies directed at increasing recycling rates 
in the economy are strongly reliant on cooperative behavior 
of private households as private waste management activities 
cannot be monitored or regulated directly without imposing 
massive regulations on all citizens.
There is a bulk of empirical literature on household 
behavior in the recycling case which has grown over the 
last decades. In a recent survey, Briguglio (2016) analyzes 
empirical papers that investigate conditions and regulatory 
approaches that potentially stimulate household cooperation 
in the case of recycling. Briguglio shows that, more recently, 
the focus of empirical literature has shifted from analyz‑
ing theoretical models of waste production (including ille‑
gal disposal and recycling) to behavioral and psychological 
theories of altruism, moral behavior, and social preferences.
Trudel (2019) suggests that the psychological factors 
that influence recycling behavior can be divided into four 
areas, namely cognitive barriers, the self, social influence, 
and product characteristics. Certain product characteris‑
tics, for example, might give rise to behavioral effects 
in the case of recycling. It can be shown that distorting 
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products from their original form, e.g., by cutting them 
up, leads to less recycling activities as compared to recy‑
cled products that have kept their original design (Tru‑
del et al. 2016). Among others, Schultz (1999) and Barr 
(2007) investigate recycling behavior from the perspective 
of social psychology. Schultz (1999) shows that voluntary 
participation and individual contributions in recycling pro‑
grams can be extended if the social environment of the 
individual household allows for group feedbacks which 
interact with personal norms. The results of Barr (2007) 
suggest that a certain mix of subjective environmental atti‑
tudes, situational characteristics, and psychological factors 
can be used to explain recycling behavior. However, in 
contrast to household behavior in the field of waste reduc‑
tion or private reuse of materials, which can be explained 
merely by subjective knowledge or concern‑based factors, 
recycling behavior has to be interpreted as a “highly nor‑
mative behavior.” This conclusion is also supported by a 
study of Cecere et al. (2014) which investigates the inter‑
play of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation in the case of 
private households’ waste management activities. Cecere 
et al. distinguish between waste reduction and recycling, 
and show that the behavior of households in reducing their 
waste can hardly be explained by social or group‑oriented 
motives as it is not an observable action. Rather, it can 
be linked to purely altruistic motives. Against this back‑
drop, extrinsic motivation associated with social norms, 
imitative behaviors, and peer pressure are important for 
recycling activities, because they are visible in society 
and are, for example, open to reciprocity considerations. 
Indirectly, they support the standard hypothesis men‑
tioned above, namely that recycling activities which are 
not driven by intrinsic motivation can be incentivized by 
economic instruments (such as taxes, levies, or deposit 
systems). Interestingly, there are several papers such as 
Kaoursakis and Birol (2008) which state that while there 
is a general public acceptance for introducing incentive‑
oriented instruments, households prefer the introduction of 
deposit refund schemes rather than unit‑pricing programs 
or pay‑as‑you‑throw schemes.
The role of social norms and warm‑glow elements of 
altruistic behavior in the case of recycling is also high‑
lighted by Abbott et al. (2013). They conclude that economic 
incentives should not be used as a substitute but rather as a 
complement for intrinsic values. Social norms and group‑
induced effects play a greater role than subjective environ‑
mental attitudes. At the same time, their results refute an 
influence of warm‑glow motifs. Politicians might therefore 
rely on social norms rather than influence behavior directly. 
These results also underline the importance of decentralized, 
supply‑side activities such as kerbside collection, which 
makes the participation of individual households more vis‑
ible to their neighborhood.
Research gap
Other studies such as Brekke et al. (2010) investigate stra‑
tegic interactions of individuals and highlight the public 
good feature of individual recycling decisions. They start 
by questioning why individual contributions to recycling 
systems are increasing in contributions of other individuals, 
as reported in several studies. Similar to other cases of envi‑
ronmentally friendly behavior of consumers, such as green 
electricity (Menges et al. 2005), Brekke et al. (2010) ask 
whether contributions of other individuals affect individual 
donations as complements or as substitutes. The authors con‑
trast impure altruism to individuals’ duty orientation when 
contributing to glass recycling systems. The hypothesis of 
duty orientation states that individuals driven by external 
norms and duties interpret behavior of other people as an 
indication of their own responsibility to participate. Brekke 
et al. (2010) point out that the concept of responsibility feel‑
ings, which are somewhat unusual in economics, is related 
to the behavioral concept of reciprocal preferences, which 
is well documented in experimental economics (see Fehr 
and Gächter 2000; Hoffman et al. 1998). On the other hand, 
impure altruism and warm‑glow motivation are described by 
pure pleasure motivation and less by social interaction. The 
empirical results of the study on recycling behavior reported 
by Brekke et al. (2010) point to strong social interaction 
effects which can be linked to the attribution of responsi‑
bility. Households who firmly believe that their recycling 
attitudes are shared within their group derive a greater sense 
of responsibility from these attitudes. According to Brekke 
et al. (2010), this observation is in line with the hypoth‑
esis that duty and responsibility cannot be interpreted as 
exogenous factors when analyzing preferences. Households 
derive conclusions about their own responsibility by observ‑
ing other households. Although such a type of responsibility 
constitutes a burden, households are willing to accept this 
burden and to engage in recycling if the duty is indisputable. 
Brekke et al. (2010) conclude that policy approaches such 
as public campaigns for recycling have merely a stimulating 
effect if they change the perception of what others are doing.
Further authors describe the connection between recy‑
cling and the theory of public goods. Rompf et al. (2017) 
point out that institutional trust can counteract the inhibi‑
tory effect of individual costs on cooperation in a collective 
action dilemma, using recycling as an example. Huhtala 
(2009) finds a negative income effect on the willingness to 
pay for recycling, but a positive income effect on the willing‑
ness to pay for more convenient incineration of waste. This 
raises distributional issues, since poorer households make 
comparatively greater efforts to behave in an environmen‑
tally sound manner.
Another approach worth mentioning is the method of 
“Identity Economics,” which was presented by Akerlof 
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and Kranton (2000) and whose relevance was recently 
underlined by economists such as Foss (2019) and Col‑
lier (2019). Akerlof and Kranton (2000) incorporate the 
factor identity into the economic behavioral model. They 
assume that societies consist of different social categories 
that share certain norms. Using a simple game‑theoretic 
model, they show that members of social categories are 
inclined to reduce deviations from these norms and adapt 
their behavior accordingly. From an economic perspec‑
tive, further investigation of these considerations, e.g., 
with respect to recycling, seems promising.
Summed up, numerous empirical studies reveal factors 
influencing recycling behavior. Although many highlight 
social interaction phenomena of household behavior when 
people contribute to public goods on a voluntary basis, 
strategic elements of individual behavior in the case of 
recycling situations have not been considered in the lit‑
erature so far. Therefore, we make a first attempt to inves‑
tigate interaction effects in different institutional settings 
to determine which role can be ascribed to individual 
environmental attitudes. The experimental design and the 
hypotheses which are tested are drawn from the model 
which is presented in the next section.
Model
Recycling in a public good framework
The starting point of our model is as follows: Voluntary 
participation and individual contributions to a recycling 
system entail positive externalities for the whole society. 
This structure allows for modeling a public goods game. A 
recycling system can, by definition, be treated as a public 
good: Its output (such as the avoidance of garbage and 
the protection of scarce resources) is represented by the 
sum of voluntary individual contributions. However, its 
benefits are also accessible to members of the society 
who have not participated in the provision (recycling pro‑
cess). Given certain assumptions, this formal model can 
be solved with respect to individual utility maximizing 
behavior (Nash equilibrium) and its social optimum (wel‑
fare maximization). In its simplest version, the model can 
be represented as follows (Ledyard 1995): Assume that a 
society consists of N households. Each single household 
i has an endowment of mi which is used for consumption. 
We assume that consumption generates waste one by one. 
Hence, each household has to derive a decision on how to 
manage mi units of waste. The household can contribute 
gi ( 0 ≤ gi ≤ mi ) units of its waste to a public recycling 
system. The payoff ui each household realizes from this 
decision is determined by the following equation:
The opportunity cost of contributing to the recycling 
system (e.g., due to inconvenience) is normalized to one 
per unit. Alternatively, waste can be dumped to trash cans 
(which is usually the case for mixed residual waste) without 
any direct or immediate cost. The benefit realized per unit of 
gi is set to a. Hence, the marginal per capita return (MPCR) 
of contributing to the public recycling system is a (with 
0 < a < 1 < Na) and represents the gap between individual 
utility maximization (gi = 0) and the Pareto‑efficient social 
optimum (gi = mi) which is driven by positive externalities. 
Hence, the question arises of how to close this gap and to 
overcome such a kind of market failure.
The empirical literature reported in the previous section 
also discusses the issue of varying the supply‑side of public 
recycling systems in several dimensions, such as its oppor‑
tunity cost structure (e.g., convenience effects of kerbside 
versus non‑kerbside systems) or the number of resources 
and materials collected. There are several papers (such as 
Kaoursakis and Birol 2008; Abbott et al. 2017) that inves‑
tigate how households’ willingness to contribute reacts to 
such supply‑side variations.
Simultaneous provision of public goods and club 
goods
In our model, we also vary the supply‑side of recycling sys‑
tems by introducing an additional feature. Public recycling 
systems can also be organized as club systems. The most 
important difference between a public good and a club good 
lies in the exclusion principle: While the benefits jointly 
generated in club goods are accessible to all members of 
the club, they are not accessible to all other members of 
society. From an economic perspective, this exclusion prin‑
ciple gives rise to an interesting point: Although the same 
problem of cooperation arises within the boundaries of the 
club as with public goods (e.g., free riding), the members of 
the club can better protect themselves from noncooperative 
behavior by virtue of the exclusionary principle. This poten‑
tial feature of club goods is related to the results of Brekke 
et al. (2010) obtained from a survey of households’ glass 
recycling activities in Norway. They show that households 
that are aware of sharing recycling attitudes within their peer 
group derive a greater sense of responsibility and contribute 
more to the recycling system. This observation is in line with 
the general hypothesis of Mancur Olson (1965): Commonly 
shared goals face organizational problems in large groups 
when individuals perceive only limited relevance of their 










848 R. Menges et al.
1 3
selective “private” benefits become an important strategy 
to overcome this social dilemma.
The importance of an exclusion mechanism of clubs is 
also emphasized by Cornes and Sandler (1996). Therefore, 
it can be necessary to exclude individuals who do not invest 
in the club’s purpose in a satisfactorily manner in order to 
prevent free riding. However, the introduction of the club 
good with its theoretical exclusion possibilities does not 
represent a change in the material incentive structure in this 
model. Firstly, there is still the possibility of investing in 
the public good and, secondly, the attraction of free‑riding 
in the club good context remains in the same form. The 
introduction of the club good hence represents a change in 
the social context of the interaction of individuals within a 
predetermined society. We are thus taking up a central idea 
in the field of the so‑called Identity Economics (Akerlof and 
Kranton 2000). According to this theory, it is not questioned 
whether the individual behavior can be explained by cost/
benefit calculations. However, the influence of these motives 
can be changed by the social context in which individuals 
act and see themselves as part of a group. It is a well‑known 
result in the experimental literature that individuals tend to 
treat their counterparts more kindly if they themselves are 
treated kindly by them (Rabin 1993).
The empirical literature on club goods is somewhat lim‑
ited in experimental economics. Although individual deci‑
sions in such types of public good experiments are mostly 
framed as charitable giving, results can also be interpreted 
in a general manner or with respect to the recycling case. 
Chakravarty and Fonseca (2017) show that cooperation and 
the overall contribution of individuals substantially increase 
when they are offered an additional group‑specific invest‑
ment opportunity. However, these efficiency gains take place 
only when the expected financial returns to the club good 
are at least equivalent to the public good. An experiment 
by Blackwell and McKee (2003) identifies two drivers of 
individual contributions to club goods and public goods 
when investment opportunities are offered simultaneously. 
Contributions to the group‑specific good are characterized 
by reciprocity as they increase with past contributions of 
other group members. The allocation of spending for the 
club good and the public good is affected by the respec‑
tive MPCR. The standard result of experimental economics 
posits that some level of cooperation in public good environ‑
ments still exists but decreases from period to period. Quite 
interestingly, it can be rejected for the club good invest‑
ment as in Blackwell and McKee (2003) where it does not 
decrease over time. An experiment by Cherry and Dickinson 
(2008) suggests that there is a general tendency that coopera‑
tion and total contributions increase when individuals are 
offered multiple sets of alternative public goods. Chen and 
Li (2009) show that the generation of group identities in 
such kind of experiments can have a large impact on social 
preferences, for instance by reducing envy effects. Several 
studies investigate constitutional effects of group identi‑
ties, such as natural identities (Chen et al. 2014) or gender 
(Brown‑Kruse and Hummels 1993), which might give rise 
to conditional, group‑specific altruism.
The public good model (1) can easily be supplemented 
with an additional club good opportunity. Assume that the 
society can be divided into two distinct subgroups with an 
equal number of households N/2 and that each household i 
also has the opportunity to invest ki ( 0 ≤ ki ≤ mi ) units of 
their waste to a group‑specific recycling system. The return 
of this investment and its MPCR is represented by b (with 
0 < b < 1 < (N/2) b). The payoff of the waste management 
decision of household i can be expressed as:
As in (1), in line with economic standard theory, util‑
ity maximizing behavior by choosing gi and ki predicts that 
gi = ki = 0 (Nash equilibrium). On the other hand, the Pareto‑
optimal solution recommends maximum contributions of all 
individuals. If a = b, the welfare solution is indifferent to 
different allocations among gi and ki, as long as gi + ki = mi. 
However, if both goods have the same MPCR (a = b < 1), 
then different group sizes might induce a different return on 
the investment if and only if specific fractions of other mem‑
bers are expected to contribute as well. While some authors 
argue in line with Olson (1965) and assume decreasing aver‑
age contributions for an increasing N in public good games, 
Ledyard (1995) reports several studies on group size effects, 
indicating that the public good is potentially more attractive 
as it has a larger number of potential contributors. For large 
groups with ten players and small groups with four players, 
Isaac and Walker (1988) show that for a small MPCR, aver‑
age contributions to the public good are higher in the large 
groups and that for a large MPCR there is no clear effect 
of group size. In order to compensate for this group size 
effect, we choose an approach suggested by Chakravarty and 
Fonseca (2017) and Blackwell and McKee (2003) and nor‑
malize the MPCR as follows: a N = b (N/2) which is equal 
to 2a = b. This approach is also in line with the concept of 
the effective average per capita ratio (APCR) which is (a 
N)/N for the public good and b (N/2)/N for the club good. 
Whereas the MPCR to the individual is a in the case of the 
public good and b in the case of the club good, the APCR 
divides the total return of investing one unit by all members 
of the society. Although, from a marginal perspective, it is 
clear that this return of the club good is actually not dis‑
tributed among all members of society, it is established as 
useful behavioral concept for comparing the relative payoffs 
with the group and the public good (Blackwell and McKee 
2003). Note that if a N = b (N/2), the Pareto‑efficient welfare 
(2)ui =
(
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optimum can include different allocations among gi and ki, 
as long as gi + ki = mi.
Applying this club good structure (2) and its intergroup 
competition to the recycling case also implies introducing 
an element of institutional competition of different recycling 
systems on the supply‑side. As an alternative to free waste 
disposal, each household has two recycling systems at its 
disposal: A system that can be used for the economy as a 
whole and a certain closed‑shop recycling system, where 
access and benefits are exclusive to members. In reality, pri‑
vate households, for example, have access to municipal recy‑
cling yards and collection points which offer their services 
exclusively to citizens of the municipality on the basis of 
public fee schedules. An example of such a disparate benefit 
could be that the improved recycling efforts of club members 
result in a cost reduction of the public fee structure due to a 
better utilization of recycling capacities. At the same time, 
households can often hand over their waste to other com‑
mercial traders, who then collect it throughout voluntary 
collections. In addition, recycling also takes place in the 
course of take‑back obligations of commercial trade.
In our experiment, two types of recycling systems are 
modeled as the public good and the club good. In both 
recycling systems, monetary incentives are identical, e.g., 
contributing one unit to the public good or the club good 
reduces the own payoff by one unit but increases social wel‑
fare (measured as the sum of N payoffs) by 2a = b.
Experimental design
Treatment structure and procedure
Since this recycling experiment forms part of a larger inter‑
disciplinary research project on sustainable household 
behavior, it serves to identify key points for longer‑term 
future investigations. The pilot reported in this paper con‑
sists of two treatments: In order to test for the relevance 
of the club good structure, the first treatment (treatment 1) 
refers to the public good model (1) and the second treat‑
ment (treatment 2) is based on the club good model (2). The 
experiment was conducted as a classroom experiment with 
36 undergraduate students during an economics course at 
the Clausthal University of Technology in Germany on 16 
July 2019. Table 1 provides an overview of the experimental 
design.
For the experiment, we used classEx software (Giamat‑
tei and Lambsdorff 2019) and a within‑subjects design. 
This means that participants are exposed to both treat‑
ments, one after the other, and each participant serves as 
his or her own baseline. A main advantage of this design 
is that it may reduce the variance of unobserved compo‑
nents, thereby increasing the precision of the estimated 
average treatment effect. As compared to other design 
options, fewer subjects have to be recruited (List et al. 
2011; Czibor et al. 2019). Moreover, the nonparametric 
tests used in the following sections work well with our 
sample size. We designed a repeated game over ten rounds 
per treatment. This approach enables us to take learning 
effects into account (Ledyard 1995) and corresponds to 
reality because waste disposal decisions have to be made 
repeatedly. However, due to organizational limitations 
of the software, we are not able to control for sequence 
effects. For further experiments, we will switch to a more 
appropriate between‑subjects design. The experiment took 
45 min, and the exact procedure can be summarized as 
follows:
• Subjects were informed that in the experiment, they 
would adopt the perspective of households which had 
to decide about their waste disposal. They were also 
informed that the task was to decide on the use of an ini‑
tial endowment. A monetary amount reflecting the results 
of these decisions would be paid out in cash on the basis 
of a lottery at the end of the experiment (see later sec‑
tion).
• After connecting mobile devices to the server, partici‑
pants underwent a questionnaire with respect to certain 
environmental attitudes which were used for later group 
separation (see later section).
• Subjects were told that they had been randomly assigned 
to a society of six households altogether and that the 
composition of this society would remain unchanged 
throughout the experiment. They were also informed 
that they did not know the other households with which 
they formed a society and that there was no way to com‑
municate with them (stranger design).
• Thereupon, printed instructions for treatment 1 were 
handed out, and—after they were read by the partici‑
pants—the corresponding game was played.
• After finishing the final round of treatment 1, participants 
were informed about the formation of the clubs within 
their society. They were assigned to “club 1” or “club 2,” 
each consisting of three households. Then, a so‑called 
slider‑game was played where the different clubs com‑
Table 1  Experimental design
Treatment Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Public good MPCR 0.3 0.3
Club good MPCR – 0.6
Endowment (waste units) 10 10
Number of rounds 10 10
Number of societies 6 6
Subjects 36 36
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peted against each other (identity reinforcement, see later 
section).
• Once again, instructions were handed out, and the second 
treatment (treatment 2) was conducted.
• The experiment ended after collecting some demographic 
data.
• Finally, participants received their payment according to 
the lottery mechanism (incentive mechanism, see later 
section).
Instructions and framing
By reading the instructions for treatment 1, participants 
are introduced to the following situation: Every partici‑
pant adopts the role of a single household which is part of a 
society of six households. Each household of this society is 
endowed with ten tokens in each round which are used for 
consumption. When consuming, waste is generated and has 
to be disposed. Two options are offered: Ten units of waste 
can be disposed either as conventional household waste 
with no additional costs or in a public recycling system. For 
every unit of waste which is brought to this recycling sys‑
tem, one token has to be paid. Due to positive externalities 
of recycling, each recycled unit generates a benefit of 0.3 
tokens for all six members of the society, as expressed in (1). 
The decision has to be made repeatedly in ten consecutive 
rounds. After each round, each player is informed about the 
investments and payoffs of all members of his or her society.
The instructions for the subsequent treatment 2 pick up 
from the previous framing of recycling opportunities but 
introduce an additional disposal option as suggested in 
Eq. (2): Alongside with the possibilities known from treat‑
ment 1, the ten units of waste can also be recycled in a sys‑
tem that is only accessible for its three club members. Again, 
costs to dispose waste in this system are one unit per token, 
while the benefit of 0.6 tokens per recycled unit is reserved 
for the three club members. Participants were aware that 
both recycling options are similarly attractive with respect 
to their social returns, because 6 ⋅ 0.3 = 3 ⋅ 0.6 . As before, 
this decision has to be repeated ten times. The structure of 
the decision screen is presented in the appendix.
Introducing and enforcing group identity
Adapting the club good model (2) to the recycling case in 
the context of a laboratory experiment involves the ques‑
tion of how to design a meaningful grouping variable which 
can be used to split a society of N subjects into nonoverlap‑
ping groups. The experimental design of the few club good 
experiments reported in the literature follows the so‑called 
minimal group paradigm. In these approaches, subjects are 
grouped by asking them to solve simple tasks such as evalu‑
ating paintings (Chakravarty and Fonseca 2017; Chen and 
Li 2009) or by exogenously assigning subjects to different 
colors (Blackwell and McKee 2003). An artificial group 
identity is created that is not at all related to the substantive 
focus of the choices made in the later experiment. Although 
subjects were able to communicate during the stage of group 
formation, these papers assume that the group identity is 
independent of uncontrollable social interaction effects that 
could influence the behavior of individuals within and out‑
side the group.
In our experimental design, we change the artificial qual‑
ity of group identity and link group identity more closely to 
the tasks individuals have to solve in the experiment. Moreo‑
ver, we indirectly motivate individuals to draw conclusions 
about common values and social preferences shared in their 
group. This stands—for example—in contrast to the phi‑
losophy of group formation as used in Chen and Li (2009), 
where an individual group member cannot draw conclu‑
sions about the pro‑social preferences of his or her group 
members (and the members of the other group) following 
the process of group formation and later in the experiment. 
We use the attitudes expressed by individuals on environ‑
mental and recycling issues for grouping them in order to 
test whether commonly shared values influence individual 
behavior. As recycling activities lead to reduced human 
impact on the environment, similar environmental attitudes 
should become a common ground of every club. The process 
of group formation and group identity reinforcement which 
subjects went through in the experiment can be summarized 
as follows:
• At the beginning of the experiment, participants were 
asked to complete a questionnaire consisting of ten ques‑
tions (see appendix). Items were obtained from Fernán‑
dez‑Manzanal et al. (2007) and adapted to our purpose. 
For every question, participants expressed their attitude 
toward the environment on a 6‑point Likert scale. It is 
important to note that the subjects were unaware that we 
would use this information for later grouping.
• After playing treatment 1, the group formation took 
place. The answers to the ten different questions were 
aggregated to an average index in order to rank all N soci‑
ety members accordingly and split societies into clubs of 
N/2 members with “club 1” in which all members appre‑
ciate the environment at least as much as any member of 
the other “club 2.”
• Subjects received three pieces of information: First, they 
were informed of being part of a club with all members 
having similar attitudes toward the environment. The 
denomination of both clubs (“club 1” or “club 2”) was 
chosen to be neutral. Second, they were informed about 
the index of their own environmental attitudes as stated 
at the beginning of the experiment. And third, they were 
also notified about the average index of the members 
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of the society they were assigned to. Consequently, the 
group membership was not explicitly mentioned, but 
could be derived from the given information.
• In order to stimulate the feeling of belonging together, 
the clubs competed in a slider‑game. The task of the club 
members was to realize as many as possible proper slider 
settings within a minute. In each society, two clubs com‑
peted against each other. The members of the winning 
club received a potential extra payment, paid out at the 
end of the experiment. Information on whether the own 
club won was revealed directly after the slider‑game.
Incentive mechanism
In both treatments and after every round, the individual con‑
tributions to the recycling system of all players of the group, 
as well as their payoff, were communicated on the screen 
(see appendix). The experiment was incentivized by a ran‑
dom lottery mechanism. Subjects were told that at the end 
of the experiment all six members of one randomly selected 
society would receive the payoff they achieved in a randomly 
selected round, with one token equaling 1 EUR. In total, 
178.80 EUR were paid out: 96.00 EUR in treatment 1; 76.80 
EUR in treatment 2, and 6 EUR in the process of identity 
reinforcement. On average, every participant received 4.97 
EUR for participating in the experiment.
Hypotheses
The experimental design described above focuses on two 
research questions: The first question relates to potential 
effects of introducing a multiple institutional designs in the 
case of recycling as opposed to a pure public good structure. 
The social return to both types of investment options is the 
same. However, such kind of financial equivalence disre‑
gards expectation formations about the behavior of other 
subjects. Assuming that there is uncertainty about the behav‑
ior of all other players, investing in the club good might 
become more attractive due to the larger MPCR. The second 
question is directed to possible in‑group effects when clubs 
discriminate between certain attitudes. More specifically, 
we investigate whether there are possible group effects if 
the composition of the groups is based on similar environ‑
mental attitudes of their members as suggested by Brekke 
et al. (2010), who identified a certain peer group effect. We 
explicitly assume that participants with stronger environ‑
mental attitudes have stronger pro‑social preferences and 
therefore contribute higher shares of their endowments. 
Hence, our hypotheses can be expressed as follows:
• Hypothesis 1 The sum of individual contributions to 
recycling systems increases when several alternatives 
are offered.
• Hypothesis 2a The contributions to the club good are 
higher in the club whose members share stronger atti‑
tudes toward the environment.
• Hypothesis 2b The total contributions (i.e., the sum of 
contributions to the club good and the public good) are 
higher in the club whose members share stronger atti‑
tudes toward the environment.
Results
The results section is structured as follows: After first pre‑
senting the more general descriptive results and second ana‑
lyzing the composition of the clubs, we turn to the implica‑
tions of the previously formulated hypotheses. In contrast 
to the instructions, we follow the economic language and 
henceforth speak of public goods (PG) and club goods (CG).
Descriptive results
Table 2 provides an overview of the average contributions 
to the PG, the CG, and total contributions as well as aver‑
age payoffs. Results are separated by treatment and round: 
The values for round 1 represent average contributions and 
payoffs of all participants in the first round only, while the 
values for round 1–10 refer to average contributions of all 
participants in all rounds. Results show that in treatment 1, 
participants contributed 38% of their endowment to the recy‑
cling system, generating an average payoff of 13.04 EUR per 
round. In treatment 2, total contributions (44%) and payoffs 
(13.52 EUR) are higher as almost 68% of contributions are 
made using the CG. Except for the public good in treatment 
2, average contributions in the first round exceed the mean 
of all ten rounds and indicate a decreasing trend over time.
Figure 1 allows for a closer examination of total contribu‑
tions in both treatments. It has to be kept in mind that using 
the within‑subjects design, all players play treatment 2 after 
having played treatment 1. In round one, total contributions 
Table 2  Average contributions and payoffs and standard deviations
Standard deviations in parentheses
Treatment Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Round 1 1–10 1 1–10
PG contributions 4.25 3.80 1.22 1.41
(3.57) (3.00) (1.90) (1.94)
CG contributions – – 3.89 2.99
(3.59) (2.63)
Total contributions 4.25 3.80 5.11 4.40
(3.57) (3.00) (3.62) (3.28)
Payoffs 13.40 13.04 14.09 13.52
(3.55) (2.79) (3.41) (2.83)
852 R. Menges et al.
1 3
are slightly lower in treatment 1 than in treatment 2 (4.25 
versus 5.11 units). A tendency of decreasing contributions 
with a minimum of about 2.8 units in round ten can be 
observed for both treatments. In treatment 2, the average 
total contributions of participants to recycling systems over 
all rounds are about 16% higher (4.40 units) than in treat‑
ment 1 (3.80 units). Yet, the curve progressions are rather 
similar and declining—a standard result in public good 
experiments (Ledyard 1995).
Composition of the clubs
As described above, the allocation to the different clubs is 
based on individuals’ environmental attitude. This was deter‑
mined by using an average from answers to ten questions 
(see appendix) using a 6‑point Likert scale. The answers 
ranged from 0 (“Environment is not important at all to me”) 
to 5 (“Environment is very important to me.”) The aver‑
age environmental attitude of members in Club High was 
3.67, and 2.08 in Club Low, reflecting a significant differ‑
ence. Further statistical analyses show no other significant 
differences regarding the composition of the groups. Using 
a Chi‑Square test, we checked for differences in terms of 
subjects’ gender, income, secondary employment, national‑
ity, and religious affiliation. In the slider‑game, which was 
conducted between the two treatments, members of Club 
High solved an average of 3.77 out of 10 tasks right, while 
Club Low received a similar result of 3.22 correct answers. 
Furthermore, the age of the undergraduate students does not 
differ considerably.
Testing hypothesis 1
Figure 1 depicts the overall contributions of both treatments 
over time. Bearing in mind that the order and financial 
attractiveness of contributions are similar in both treatments, 
this graph reveals interesting results. Instead of continuing 
a declining trend after treatment 1, the overall contributions 
surge to a new maximum level in the first round of treatment 
2. The peak is reached in round 2 where 5.8 out of 10 units 
are contributed to both goods. After that, contributions 
decrease again.
For a statistical analysis of differences in contributions 
between the two treatments, we use the Wilcoxon Sign‑Rank 
test and define the threshold of statistical significance as 
p = 0.05. This nonparametric test is used due to the absence 
of normally distributed values (e.g., due to differences 
between mean and median values as shown in Table 3) and 
since it is applicable to small sample sizes. The test com‑
pares participants’ contributions in the respective rounds of 
both treatments to check the equality of the central tenden‑
cies. Table 3 provides the results of this test for all partici‑
pants as well as separated by the clubs. Although partici‑
pants were not aware of the separation into two clubs during 
the first treatment, their contributions can be traced back and 
evaluated ex‑post.
Results show that hypothesis 1, which predicts an increas‑
ing sum of individual contributions to a recycling system 
after offering several alternatives, cannot be proven true for 
all rounds and participants (p = 0.112). A closer examina‑
tion shows significant differences for the first three rounds 
only (round 1: p = 0.048, round 2: p = 0.002, and round 3: 
p = 0.007).
Nonetheless, we find meaningful results when differen‑
tiating between the different clubs. Contributions of Club 
High members significantly increase in treatment 2 com‑
pared with treatment 1 (p = 0.006), while no significant dif‑
ferences can be shown for Club Low. At this point, we refer 
to the relevance of the composition of the two clubs which 
will be discussed in more detail later.
Testing hypotheses 2
The second hypothesis asks about possible differences in 
the subjects’ behavior in relation to their association with 
the clubs in treatment 2. Unlike in treatment 1, the subjects 
now know that they have been assigned to a club according 
to their environmental attitude and have their additional 
CG recycling option. As this comparison is based on a 
between‑subjects level, the hypothesis is tested by using 
the nonparametric Mann–Whitney U criterion. Again, 
Fig. 1  Average total contributions in both consecutive treatments
Table 3  Comparison of contributions across treatments and clubs
Median in parentheses
Club High Club Low All
Total contributions in Treatment 1 4.08 3.52 3.80
(3.05) (3.15) (3.10)
Total contributions in Treatment 2 5.51 3.29 4.40
(5.00) (2.95) (4.25)
Wilcoxon Sign‑Rank p = 0.006 p = 0.421 p = 0.112
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this test tends to be a good option in the absence of nor‑
mally distributed values and is applicable to our sample 
sizes. We define the threshold of statistical significance 
as p = 0.05.
Table 4 allows for a comparison of average contribu‑
tions and payoffs in both clubs in treatment 2 in order to 
test hypotheses 2. Results show that Club High members 
made significantly higher contributions to the CG than 
Club Low members in treatment 2 (p = 0.012). Hence, 
these results support hypothesis 2a. Regarding hypothesis 
2b, stating that total contributions are higher in Club High, 
the results are not so clear: Despite differences in the total 
contributions of the two clubs, the Mann–Whitney U test 
results in p = 0.059 and does—though marginally—not 
attest a significant increase. Overall, Club High members 
realized significantly higher payoffs as compared with 
Club Low members in treatment 2 (p = 0.037). Besides, 
no significant differences in the two clubs’ contributions 
to the PG and, more interestingly, to the PG in treatment 1 
can be detected (see gray bottom of Table 4).
A further impression of the composition of the con‑
tributions over the rounds can be obtained by consulting 
Figs. 2 and 3. They show that the contributions to the PG 
are rather stable and do not differ significantly for the two 
clubs (Mann–Whitney U: p = 0.938). Differences in the 
total contributions are thus mainly caused by contributions 
to the CG. Furthermore, the decreasing contributions in 
the second treatment—in contrast to the first—are mainly 
due to contributions to the CG. Reasons for this different 
contribution behavior can therefore be linked to the differ‑
ent club compositions.  
Conclusion
The results of the experiment reported in this paper primarily 
point to the fact that subjects show a relatively stable degree 
of cooperation in both consecutive treatments. On average 
(over all rounds), subjects invested 38% of their endowment 
in treatment 1 and 44% in treatment 2. At the same time, 
a standard result of experimental economics which postu‑
lates a clear reduction in cooperation from round to round in 
repeated games (Ledyard 1995) is confirmed in this study. 
Since both treatments were played in succession (with the 
same set of co‑players in fixed societies) without varying 
their order, it is of course not unlikely that the round‑related 
decline in cooperativeness also took place across both treat‑
ments. However, in an experiment by Andreoni (1988), a 
public goods game (PGG) is played over ten rounds and then 
restarted with the same group composition. The restarted 
PGG is repeated only three times which is, however, not 
known by the subjects. The results show that the contribu‑
tions in these three rounds are only minimally lower (a 0.2 
Table 4  Comparison of contributions and payoffs in Club High and 
Club Low
Median values in parentheses
Club High Club Low Mann–Whitney U
Treatment 2
PG contributions 1.39 1.44 p = 0.938
(0.35) (0.30)
CG contributions 4.12 1.86 p = 0.012
(3.95) (1.30)
Total contributions 5.51 3.29 p = 0.059
(5.00) (2.95)
Payoffs 14.45 12.59 p = 0.037
(13.27) (12.09)
Treatment 1
Total contributions 4.08 3.52 p = 0.521
(3.05) (3.15)
Payoffs 12.75 13.32 p = 0.628
(12.73) (13.15)
Fig. 2  Contributions to public good and club good in treatment 2 for 
Club High
Fig. 3  Contributions to public good and club good in treatment 2 for 
Club Low
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decline of contributions in round 1 of the restarted PGG) 
than in the first PGG. In our experiment, there is also no 
reduction in cooperation when comparing both treatments. 
There are no statistically significant differences in total con‑
tributions to the recycling systems. Against this background, 
it is surprising that the average total contributions in treat‑
ment 2 exceed contributions in the first treatment by 16%. 
When we consider only the first round of both treatments, 
the contributions in treatment 2 are 20% higher compared 
with treatment 1. This indicates that by introducing the club 
good option an activation of cooperation could take place, 
which potentially counteracts the trend of reducing coopera‑
tion in repeated games.
The composition of the clubs in the second treatment, on 
the other hand, seems to induce a significant effect on indi‑
viduals’ contributions to the recycling system. On average, 
the members of the club with stronger environmental atti‑
tudes (Club High) invested 41% of their endowment in the 
club good, while members of the other club (Club Low) only 
invested about 19%. In Chen and Li (2009), an individual 
group member cannot conclude the pro‑social preferences 
of his group members (and the members of the other group) 
through the process of group formation. However, partici‑
pants in our experiment may assume that stronger environ‑
mental attitudes are correlated with stronger pro‑social pref‑
erences. If a participant is aware of belonging to the group 
with the lower environmental attitudes, he might assume that 
the average contributions in his group are lower than that in 
the group with the stronger environmental attitudes. This 
would, of course, have an impact on whether he decides to 
invest in the club good. Although contributions to the club 
good decrease from round to round, which is common in 
repeated games, this observation is in line with the result of 
Brekke et al. (2010). They state that households who firmly 
believe that their recycling attitudes are shared within their 
group derive a greater sense of responsibility for participat‑
ing. An explanation of this experimental group effect could 
be that it stimulates a sense of belonging, which allows sub‑
jects to derive conclusions about their own responsibility. 
Quite remarkably, contributions to the public good do not 
differ much between these clubs and do not decrease from 
round to round.
A complementary explanatory approach can be made with 
the concept of identity economics from Akerlof and Kranton 
(2000). In this context, the two clubs represent social cat‑
egories and their social norms serve as a guideline for the 
disposal decision. All participants are aware that they have 
been divided into groups of high and low environmental atti‑
tudes and can draw conclusions about which group they are in. 
Positive recycling behavior tends to be the norm for the group 
with positive environmental attitudes. This forecast is also 
reflected in our results: Club Highs’ contributions to their CG 
is higher. At the same time, in the existing dilemma situation, 
this results in a separation from the other club which is sub‑
jected to different norms and thus reflects a different recycling 
behavior. For policymakers, this implies that relevant stand‑
ards should be strengthened in all social subgroups.
As described, a central observation of the experiment 
refers to the total contributions that individuals make to the 
offered recycling systems. Note that the introduction of the 
club good option in the second treatment is an extension of 
the options for action without changing the material incen‑
tive structure of the first treatment. The introduction of the 
additional club good option is therefore merely a change in 
the social context of the individual decision. However, this 
variation in the social context led to an increase in the total 
contributions on average. While the individuals assigned to 
the respective “Club Low” do not show a statistically sig‑
nificant change in their total contributions, the total contri‑
butions of the individuals assigned to the respective “Club 
High” increase significantly. Therefore, a reasonable policy 
implication is to localize recycling systems and make their 
benefits local public goods.
It is difficult to answer whether the results observed in the 
experiment are due to the creation of exclusion possibilities 
in the case of club goods, or whether this is rather due to the 
stronger environmental attitudes of the individuals in Club 
High. In fact, the influence of these two factors cannot be sep‑
arated. Environmentally friendly individuals did not behave 
significantly different from the less environmentally friendly 
individuals in the first treatment. Statistically significant dif‑
ferences in the behavior of these two groups arise solely in 
the second treatment with the introduction of the club good 
option. It is only the change in the social context of individual 
interactions that leads to the fact that the individuals with 
stronger environmental attitudes make higher contributions 
than the individuals with weaker environmental attitudes. In 
order to discriminate between the two factors “introduction 
of a club good option and excludability” and “environmental 
attitudes,” we will vary the experimental design in further 
experiments and test for the influence of alternative group‑
ing variables when introducing the clubs. In addition, future 
investigations should rather be conducted as between‑subjects 
designs in order to exclude order effects of the treatments. If 
the groups’ influence on the cooperative recycling behavior in 
future investigations can be substantiated, an interesting exten‑
sion of these experiments is to include endogenous group pro‑
cesses, for example through elements of gamification.
With regard to the further procedure, the question may 
be raised whether further insights into individual recycling 
behavior could also be obtained from simulations instead of 
experiments. Basically, experiments and simulations represent 
complementary methods to analyze the connection between 
individual behavior and social results (Dawid and Delli Gatti 
2018). However, the use of (agent‑based) simulations is based 
on concrete assumptions about the structure of individual 
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preferences and the decision‑making behavior of individuals. 
Here, deviations from the standard assumptions of microeco‑
nomics can be modeled and simulated using stochastic pro‑
cesses as well. The essence of experiments, on the other hand, 
is that the individual behavior is empirically observed in view 
of a given incentive structure and is not given exogenously. 
The question of whether individuals feel motivated to change 
their behavior in repeated interactions when the social context 
of interaction is varied cannot be answered with simulations. 
However, simulation programs can be used to transfer knowl‑
edge gained from experiments to other model relationships.
The experiment presented in this paper was initially con‑
ceived as a pilot study which aimed to obtain information for 
the design of a broader study. The results, especially those 
regarding hypothesis 1, are to be interpreted with caution, 
since the design of the experiment did not allow for a variation 
of the treatment order: This uncontrollable sequence effect is 
likely to have been at the expense of cooperation in treatment 
2. However, the results of the introduction of the club good 
option turned out to be even more interesting, as this seems to 
induce a significant effect on cooperation behavior.
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Appendix
Questions used for club formation (based 
on Fernández‑Manzanal et al. 2007)
 1. I am willing to consume less and to forgo some com‑
forts if it helps to protect the environment.
 2. I am willing to spend more money in order to purchase 
a recyclable packaging.
 3. I like spending time in nature to understand the envi‑
ronment in which I live.
 4. I am trying to find out how my behavior influences the 
environment.
 5. If I have to choose between a new highway and a con‑
versation area, I will choose the conversation area.
 6. If the public transport system was more efficient, I 
would prefer it to the car.
 7. We should try to conserve plants and animals, even 
though it is expensive.
 8. Environmental education activities for children are 
important.
 9. Our laws should be changed in order to reduce pollu‑
tion of the environment.
 10. Universities should schedule more environmental 
issues.
Decision screen in classEx (example)
See Fig. 4.
Fig. 4  Decision screen in classEx (example)
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